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JUST [CAN'T] DO IT: THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
OVERLY RESTRICTED NIKE'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN 
HOLDING THAT ITS PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE COMMERCIAL 
SPEECH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Have you ever been Niked? According to an October 17, 1996 re-
port on CBS's 48 Hours, to be "Niked" means to have one worker take 
out his or her aggression on a fellow worker. 1 The CBS expose re-
ported that Nike's factories in Vietnam were forcing workers to func-
tion under "sweatshop" conditions.2 Employees were "paid below 
minimum wage, work[ed] exhausting hours and sometimes face[d] 
physical abuse-all to create the hottest and most popular athletic 
shoe in the world."3 
In response to public criticism and the unfavorable report, Nike 
publicized its existing code of conduct, developed in the early 1990s 
to ensure compliance with local employment laws in its foreign facto-
ries.4 Despite Nike's intentions in creating the code-"to guarantee a 
humane workplace"-an audit revealed that forty of fIfty employees 
interviewed had never read the code, forty-eight worked longer than 
permitted by law, and that levels of the toxic chemical toluene were 
dangerously high.s As a second method of defense, Nike, "for the 
purpose of maintaining and increasing its sales and profIts,"6 pub-
lished various news releases, advertisements, and letters to newspaper 
editors regarding its factory conditions.7 
In opposition to the advertising campaign, Marc Kasky fIled suit 
against Nike under a California consumer protection law that permits 
any citizen to formally accuse businesses of disseminating misleading 
or false statements to the public.s California's law gives standing to 




4. Roger Parloff, Can We Talk? A Shocking First Amendment Ruling Against Nike 
Radically Reduces the Rights oj Carporations to Speak Their Minds. Will the Su-
preme Court Let It Stand?, FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at lO2. The code of con-
duct was "a statement of aspirational goals its contractors were supposed to 
live up to." Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 248 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. lO99 
(2003), and cert. dismissed, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003). 
7. Tony Mauro, Let Nike Speak Up Jor Itself, USA TODAY, Oct. 14,2002, at A15. 
8. James Kilpatrick, The Right to Free Speech and Tennis Shoes, TULSA WORLD, 
Dec. 2, 2002, at A9. "[P] rovisions of California law [sic] authorize a private 
individual, acting as a 'private attorney general,' effectively to prosecute a 
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citizens who have not been injured; in all other states, however, Kasky 
would not have a valid cause of action. Nike prevailed in the lower 
courts;9 the Supreme Court of California, however, overturned the 
judgments and found for Kasky.l0 
Thereafter, Nike appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 11 The Court granted certiorari to decide two questions: 
(1) whether a corporation participating in a public debate 
may "be subjected to liability for factual inaccuracies on the 
theory that its statements are 'commercial speech' because 
they might affect consumers' opinions about the business as 
a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing 
decisions"; and (2) assuming the California Supreme Court 
properly characterized such statements as commercial 
speech, whether the "First Amendment, as applied to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, permit[s] sub-
jecting speakers to the legal regime approved by that court 
in the decision beloW."12 
Ultimately, the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari "as improvidently 
granted"13 without deciding whether corporate publicity, which may 
be less than completely accurate, is entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.14 
Because the California ruling was upheld, corporations in any pub-
lic debate will now need to balance the desire to speak freely against 
the risk of severe court-imposed sanctions. 15 The California ruling 
means that critics of Nike's business practices can say anything, but 
Nike's participation in public statements or debate would be stifled. 16 
Unfortunately, "[a]t a time when business needs to be more, not less, 
transparent, this will encourage [corporations] to withdraw from pub-
lic debate and provide only the bare minimum of information on any 
subject."17 
business for unfair competition or false advertising." Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 
123 S. Ct. 2554, 2559 (Breyer, j., dissenting). See also CAL. Bus. & PROF. 
CODE §§ 17200, 17204, 17500, 17535 (West 1997). 
9. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 863 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 45 
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cm. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), and cm. dismissed, 
123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003). 
10. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247. 
11. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003). 
12. Id. at 2555. 
13. Id. 
14. Shannon McCaffrey, Supreme Court Will Test Nike's Defense: The justices Will 
Hear the Case of the Sneaker Maker, VVho an Activist Says Stretched the Truth, 
PHIlA. INQ., Jan. 11, 2003, at A3. 
15. Parloff, supra note 4, at 102. 
16. Mauro, supra note 7, at A15. 
17. Alex Benady, Nike's Supreme Fight on Free Speech, TIMES OF LONDON, Sept. 23, 
2002, § 3 (Business), at 4. 
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This case was perhaps the Supreme Court's "most important case in 
years on the free speech rights of companies."18 Despite the potential 
impact of this case on worldwide industry, the Court's failure to over-
turn the California ruling will "'chill' the exercise of free speech 
rights"19 and cause corporations and other speakers to "censor their 
own expression well beyond what the law may constitutionally 
demand."20 
This comment will first examine the extent of First Amendment 
protection provided to commercial speech, the tests used to analyze 
commercial speech, and explain the California law that allowed Marc 
Kasky to file suit as a private individual. Second, this comment will 
investigate the potential impact of the Court's decision on corporate 
communications today and in the future. Finally, it will report on the 
procedural history and current status of the case, and the status of 
commercial speech as a whole. 
II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL DOCTRINES 
A. Commercial Speech Is Protected by the First Amendment Only When It Is 
Found Not to be False or Misleadintl 
Commercial speech includes paid advertisements and product la-
bels that describe food as "low fat," "chocolaty," or "new and im-
proved."22 In other words, commercial speech is speech that 
companies use to sell their products to the public.23 Commercial 
speech differs from political speech, which is completely protected by 
the First Amendment, because it can be, and usually is, regulated by 
the government.24 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has used three tests to deter-
mine when speech is commercial. The first test applies limited First 
Amendment protection to speech promoting commercial transac-
tions. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, the Supreme Court overturned a state statute that prohibited 
the display and distribution of prescription drug information.25 The 
Court stated that First Amendment protection is not completely lost 
on commercial speech just because the particular speech is in a form 
that involves solicitation and profit.26 In order to support a market-
18. Supreme Court to Hear Case on Commercial Speech: California Suit Accuses Nike of 
False Statements About Overseas Factories, HOUSTON CHRON.,Jan. 11, 2003, at 6. 
19. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2568 (2003) (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
20. Id. at 2569. 
21. See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002). 
22. See Pari off, supra note 4, at 108. 
23. See id. 
24. Id. 
25. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976). 
26. Id. at 761. 
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place of ideas where the consuming public can make informed eco-
nomic decisions, some protection must be afforded to commercial 
speech.27 The function of commercial speech is to propose a transac-
tion; therefore, even though it does not get full First Amendment pro-
tection, commercial speech does deserve some protection.28 As a 
result, the state may only regulate techniques that are false, deceptive, 
or misleading.29 
The second test requires consideration of economic motivation, ad-
vertising format, and specific reference to a product before determin-
ing if the utterance is commercial speech.30 In Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp., the U.S. Postal Service refused to deliver a contracep-
tives manufacturer's unsolicited advertisements.3] The Supreme 
Court found that the Postal Service's actions were unconstitutional be-
cause they violated the manufacturer's First Amendment rights.32 
From a constitutional standpoint, the Court reasoned that "[t]he fact 
that protected speech may be offensive to some persons does not jus-
tifY its suppression," and that anyone who was offended by the objec-
tionable mailings could simply choose not to look at them or throw 
them away.33 Moreover, addressing the specific content of the mail-
ing, the Court stated that advertisements implicating "substantial indi-
vidual and societal interests are particularly deserving of some First 
Amendment protection."34 
The Court also applied what is listed below as the third test-the 
Central Hudson test35-and noted that "[t]he protection available for 
[a] particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the 
expression and of the governmental interests served by its regula-
tion."36 The Court opined that economic motivation for mailing ad-
vertisements, combined with other characteristics, "provides strong 
support ... that the informational pamphlets are properly character-
ized as commercial speech"37 and deserving of the "protection ac-
corded to commercial speech."38 
27. [d. at 765. 
28. See id. at 761, 771 (observing that states can regulate the "time, place, and 
manner" of commercial speech, but the content is protected by the First 
Amendment). 
29. [d. at 771-72. 
30. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). 
31. [d. at 63. 
32. [d. at 75. 
33. [d. at 71-72. 
34. See id. at 69 (noting that the advertisements were entitled to First Amend-
ment protection partially because contraception "is protected from unwar-
ranted state interference"). 
35. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980). 
36. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp, 447 U.S. at 
563). 
37. [d. at 67. 
38. [d. at 68. 
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The third test for commercial speech is multi-leveled and is related 
solely to a speaker's economic interests.39 In Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric v. Public Seroice Commission of New York, the Public Service Com-
mission attempted to control advertising that promoted the use of 
electricity.40 The Court developed a four-part test that applies inter-
mediate level scrutiny to commercial speech.41 
The first step of the Central Hudson analysis asks "whether the ex-
pression is protected by the First Amendment."42 In order for a state-
ment to be protected by the First Amendment it "must concern [a] 
lawful activity and not be misleading."43 The second step asks whether 
the government has a substantial interest in regulating the activity. 44 
The third question asks if the regulation directly advances the govern-
mental interest.45 The fourth and last step in the analysis addresses 
whether the regulation is more excessive than necessary to serve the 
governmental interest expressed in the regulation.46 
In Kasky v. Nike, Inc., the Supreme Court of California primarily fo-
cused on the Central Hudson test.47 The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy 
and Bolger tests were the first to be developed and are more general 
versions of the first and second prongs found in the Central Hudson 
test. 48 For purposes of this comment, the tests were separated to pro-
vide emphasis on their origin. 
B. California State Law Prohibits False and Misleading Advertising and 
Provides Consumers with the Ability to Enforce State Law49 
California is the only state that has extended its law against false and 
misleading advertising by businesses to allow private suits concerning 
a company's public statements.50 The law was "designed to punish 
used-car salesmen who pitch clunkers as dreamboats, or manufactur-
ers who bill foreign-made goods as 'made in the USA."'51 Businesses 














Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 56l. 
Id. at 55S. 
See id. at 566; see also Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251 (Cal. 2002) (not-
ing that the Court "articulated an intermediate-scrutiny test" in Central 
Hudson). 





See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 251-54 (Cal. 2002). 
See Pari off, supra note 4, at lOS ("Originally the Court's definition of com-
mercial speech was narrow: speech that does 'no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction.' But with the onset of more subtle, varied, and 
sophisticated advertising techniques, that definition was broadened."). 
Mauro, supra note 7, at A15. 
David G. Savage, Nike Takes Ad Liability Case to High Court, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
15, 2002, at B6. 
Mauro, supra note 7, at A15. 
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being enjoined from making similar statements in the future, to giv-
ing up profits made in connection with speech that is the subject of a 
lawsuit. 52 
C. Nike's Commercial Speech Began on Television and Ended in the 
Courtroom 
In October 1996, CBS's 48 Hours aired an expose addressing "sweat-
shop" conditions in Nike's factories in Vietnam.53 According to the 
broadcast, employees were "paid below minimum wage, work[ed] ex-
hausting hours and sometimes face[d] physical abuse-all to create 
the hottest and most popular athletic shoe in the world."54 Nike re-
sponded to the claims by issuing press releases and sending letters to 
newspaper editors, athletic department directors, and university 
presiden ts. 55 
Nike's campaign to defend its labor practices in foreign countries 
spurred Marc Kasky, a California activist,56 to take advantage of the 
state's broad unfair competition law.57 Kasky claimed that Nike's ad-
vertisements were not political speech aimed at counteracting nega-
tive press, but instead, were deceitful advertisements used to promote 
product sales.58 As such, even if Nike's statements were unintention-
ally misleading, Kasky argued that the company should be punished 
because the California unfair competition statute does not require a 
malicious intent to deceive the public.59 
The Court of Appeal of California affirmed the trial court's decision 
in favor of Nike.60 The court held that Nike's communications were 











Business Eye on Nike Appeal, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 5, 2002, at C2. 
48 Hours, supra note 1. 
Id. 
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 854, 857 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd, 45 
P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003), and cert. dismissed, 
123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003). 
See Parloff, supra note 4, at 108. Previously, Kasky settled false advertising 
disputes with Perrier regarding its "spring water," and with Pillsbury Co. 
labeling vegetables harvested in Mexico as "San Francisco style." Id. 
See Kilpatrick, supra note 8, at A9 (stating that the California law "makes it a 
criminal misdemeanor to disseminate any statement 'which is untrue or 
misleading' and ... permits any citizen to sue for enforcement"). 
Free Speech for Nike, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2002, at B6. 
See Pari off, supra note 4, at 104 (explaining that court sanctions could in-
clude a return of profits earned as a result of the misleading statements, the 
running of an additional campaign to correct lie misunderstandings, and/ 
or Kasky's attorneys' fees). 
Kasky, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863 ("Our analysis of the press releases and letters 
as forming part of a public dialogue on a matter of public concern within 
the core area of expression protected by the First Amendment compels the 
conclusion that the trial court properly sustained the defendants' demurrer 
without leave to amend."). 
Id. at 860. 
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court opined that when issues are of public importance, the truth of 
the statements involved in the debate are irrelevant because the pub-
lic will decide what to believe.62 Citing the "famous words" of Judge 
Learned Hand, the court stated: 
[T]he First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions 
are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, 
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many 
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it 
our a11."63 
The court of appeal also noted that, just because Nike' s speech had 
an economic motive, it did not mean that it was no longer significant 
to the intended audience.64 "The purpose of [Nike's] communica-
tions was not merely to sell shoes but to change minds. The protec-
tion of efforts to change minds is the very essence of free speech."65 
The Supreme Court of California reversed the court of appeal, 
holding that Nike's advertising campaign was commercial speech and, 
therefore, not entitled to full First Amendment protection.66 The 
court held that corporate public statements aimed at maintaining or 
increasing sales and profits, or in response to allegations regarding 
poor working conditions, are commercial speech and can be regu-
lated to prevent consumer deception.67 The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia concluded that Nike's response to the 48 Hours expose was 
commercial speech because the direct recipients of the information 
were previous and potential buyers of the company's products.68 
Nike's factual statements about its business operations, according to 
the court, were entitled to less constitutional protection because Nike 
was capable of verifying the accuracy of the statements.69 Although 
the Supreme Court of California concluded that Nike's speech was 
"commercial speech for purposes of applying state laws barring false 
and misleading commercial messages,"70 it did not decide whether 
that speech was indeed false or misleading, and it remanded the mat-
ter to the intermediate appellate court for further proceedings consis-
tent with its opinion.71 
62. See id. at 861. 
63. Id. (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
1943) ). 
64. See id. at 862 ("[C]ommercial motivation does not transform noncommer-
cial speech into commercial speech.") (quoting Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 
728 P.2d 1177, 1186 (1986)). 
65. Free Speech for Nike, supra note 58, at B6. 
66. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262-63 (Cal. 2002). 
67. Id. at 262. 
68. Id. at 258-59. 
69. See id at 259. The converse argument is that "[f]actual errors are part of 
any robust back-and-forth and do not generally nullify the constitutional 
protection afforded to speech." Free Speech for Nike, supra note 58, at B6. 
70. Kasky, 45 P.3d at 247. 
71. Id. at 262-63. 
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On October 16, 2002, Nike submitted its petition for certiorari to 
the United States Supreme Court.72 Central to Nike's argument was 
that the public was entitled to information regarding issues of general 
concern, and the California ruling prevents dissemination of informa-
tion that will lead to informed decision making. 73 Kasky filed his reply 
brief on November 15, 2002.14 In January 2003, the Court decided to 
grant certiorari and heard oral arguments on April 23, 2003.75 
Two primary issues controlled oral arguments: (1) did Nike's com-
munications meet the requirements of commercial speech; and (2) 
does the California law under which Kasky filed his suit unconstitu-
tionally turn private citizens into "private attorneys general" by al-
lowing anyone to bring a false advertising claim without suffering any 
actual harm?76 
Justice O'Connor was pushing for a clear definition of commercial 
speech and advertising, while Justice Scalia found the definition irrele-
vant as long as Nike's campaign was misleading.77 These questions 
were equalized by Justice Breyer when he stated: "[i]t's both [com-
mercial and non-commercial speech] if you try to sell a product and 
make a statement important to the public debate.,,78 Justice Breyer 
continued to summarize the difficult issue before the Court by stating 
that "[t]he government 'has the right to regulate unfair, deceptive 
advertising' to protect consumers from being duped . . . . On the 
other hand, 'the [First] Amendment is designed to protect all partici-
pants in a public debate."'79 
Nike's argument began with Harvard University law professor Lau-
rence Tribe stating that the letters written by Nike and sent to athletic 
directors, assuring them that the company did not' engage in unfair 
labor practices, were not commercial speech because the letters were 
not addressed to specific customers.80 U.S. Solicitor General Theo-
dore B. Olson appeared on behalf of the United States, as amicus cu-
riae, supporting Nike.81 In strong support of previous arguments 
72. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 2002 WL 32101098 (No. 
02-575). 
73. See id. at *9. 
74. Respondent'S Brief in Opposition, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 2002 WL 32lO1066 
(No. 02-575). 
75. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003). 
76. Bill Mears, Supreme Court Looks at Free Speech Rights of Corporate A rnerica: Oppo-




79. David G. Savage, justices Urged to Reject Suit Against Nike: The California Case 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court Will Test the Boundary Between Corporate Free Speech 
and False Advertising, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at A20. 
80. Charles Lane, Supreme Court Considers Nike's 'Free Speech,' WASH. POST, Apr. 
24, 2003, at E2. 
81. Id. 
2004] Nike's First Amendment Rights 291 
made to the Court,82 Olson urged the Court to avoid attempting to 
define the differences between commercial and non-commercial 
speech, and instead to declare the California unfair competition law 
unconstitutiona1.83 Olson, and his arguments on behalf of the Bush 
Administration, focused on the realistic fear that the California law 
transforms "anyone with a whim and a grievance and a filing fee ... 
[into] a government-licensed censor."84 Comments made by Justice 
Ginsburg echoed the concerns voiced by Olson.85 
Ultimately, on June 26,2003, in a per curiam decision, the Supreme 
Court decided to dismiss the grant of certiorari that it granted only six 
months earlier.86 Concurring Justice Stevens justified the Court's de-
cision to avoid taking a stand on the future of commercial speech by 
stating that: (1) the Supreme Court of California had not entered a 
final judgment; (2) neither Nike nor Marc Kasky had standing to 
bring the suit to federal court; and (3) any decision made by the 
Court would be premature.87 Justice Stevens believed the Supreme 
Court of California decision to be interlocutory, and that some of 
Nike's disputed communications might be classified as commercial, 
while others might be non-commercia1.88 Without clear categoriza-
tion, Justice Stevens reasoned that there is a possibility that additional 
federal questions could arise during further state proceedings, 
thereby making any decision by the Supreme Court of California not 
fina1.89 
The dissent responded by pointing to the fact that the Supreme 
Court of California made its final decision, admitting that there was 
nothing left to decide on "that' issue of federal importance.9o The 
dissent supported its disagreement with the majority'S decision by cit-
ing previous examples wherein the Supreme Court made a final deter-
mination of similar holdings by the Supreme Court of California.91 
The dissent also explained that a reversal of the Supreme Court of 
California would be a final decision that would allow the court of ap-
peal decision to stand as law in the state.92 Additionally, the dissent 












See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
Lane, supra note 80, at E2. 
Id. 
Robert S. Greenberger, Bush Administration Backs Nike in High Court Case, 
WALL ST.]', Apr. 24, 2003, at A12. 
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2554 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing 
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). 
Id. at 2555 (Stevens,]., concurring). 
Id. at 2556-57 (Stevens,]., concurring). 
Id. at 2556 (Stevens,]., concurring). 
Id. at 2563 (Breyer,]. and O'Connor,]., dissenting). 
Id. at 2563-64 (Breyer,]. and O'Connor,]., dissenting) (citing Cox Broad. 
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)). 
Id. at 2564 (Breyer,]. and O'Connor,]., dissenting) (stating that "[a]n out-
right reversal of the California Supreme Court would reinstate the judg-
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cation, the court would "simply seek to determine whether Nike's 
statements were false or misleading, and perhaps whether Nike was 
negligent in making those statements."93 
The m~ority's second reason for dismissing the writ of certiorari 
was that neither party had federal standing.94 The Court found that 
Kasky lacked standing because by acting as a private attorney general 
for the state of California, he had neither a federal claim nor had he 
suffered any actual injury.95 The Court also found that Nike lacked 
standing because the Supreme Court of California's decision was not a 
"final judgment alerting tangible legal rights."96 The dissent agreed 
that Kasky lacked standing because he did not suffer an "injury in 
fact."97 The dissent disagreed with respect to Nike, however, because 
standing applies to the plaintiff who brought the action to federal 
court, not the plaintiff that sued in state court.98 The dissent noted 
that, "Nike, the state-court defendant-not Kasky, the plaintiff-has 
brought the case to this Court [a]nd Nike has standing to complain 
here of Kasky's actions .... These actions threaten Nike with 'injury 
in fact.' "99 
As its last justification for dismissal, the majority stated that a deci-
sion at this juncture would be premature. IOO The majority recognized 
the uniqueness and importance of the First Amendment issue 
presented in this case,101 but warned that a detailed answer to such a 
significant constitutional issue should not be announced until after 
analysis of a complete factual record is established. 102 In rebuttal, the 
dissent cited Cox Broadcasting System v. Cohn, stating, "a refusal immedi-
ately to review the state-court decision might seriously erode federal 
policy."103 The dissenting Justices also recognized the "chilling" effect 
on speech feared by so many individuals, and corporate and govern-
ment entities in the wake of the California ruling. 104 
ment of the California intermediate court, which affirmed dismissal of the 
complaint without leave to amend."). 
93. [d. at 2563 (Breyer, j. and O'Connor, j., dissenting). After the Supreme 
Court dismissal, the parties settled out of court. See infra note 214 and ac-
companying text. 
94. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2557. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. at 2558. 
97. [d. at 2560-61 (Breyer, j. and O'Connor, j., dissenting). 
98. [d. (Breyer, j. and O'Connor, j., dissenting). The dissent stated that 
"[slince Nike, not Kasky, now seeks to bring this case to federal court, why 
should Kasky's standing problems make a critical difference?" [d. 
99. [d. at 2560. 
100. [d. at 2555, 2558. 
101. [d. at 2558. 
102. [d. at 2559. 
103. [d. at 2562, 2568 (Breyer, j. and O'Connor, j., dissenting) (citing Cox 
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975». 
104. See infra Part lILA; see also Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2567-69. 
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In its conclusion, the majority admitted that a more elaborate fac-
tual record might, in fact, add to the public debate that Nike is trying 
to protect, but thought it wise not to make a decision addressing the 
current marketplace of ideas at this stage in the process.105 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Corporate Expression of Commercial Speech Will Never be the Same 
The impact of the Supreme Court of California's decision will be 
felt far beyond the shores of the United States. I06 For example, Euro-
pean businesses are required to publish "social responsibility" re-
ports. I07 Social responsibility reports encourage active 
communication between businesses and stakeholders by requiring 
complete disclosure of corporate information to the public. 108 These 
businesses will find it more difficult than American businesses to re-
frain from sanctioned public debate because they must comply with 
the governing corporate communication regulations. 109 It will be dif-
ficult to adhere to the regulations, not because of the specifics pub-
lished in the reports, but because the self-proclaiming statements are 
at risk of being interpreted as misleading. For example, Nike lists in 
its fiscal year 2001 Corporate Responsibility Report eight different 
ways that it hopes to aid environmental protectionYo It is possible, 
but hopefully unlikely, that this list could be viewed as an advertise-
ment trying to gather support from environmentalists as product con-
sumers. Under current California law, this type of interpretation 
would lead to litigation or sanctions. Interpreting corporate responsi-
bility reports as product advertisements is exactly what companies that 
publish such reports, whether by choice or under mandate, are trying 
to avoid. 
In an effort to illustrate the far-reaching impact of this case, on 
March 3, 2003, SRI Media and CoreRatings Limited, both British me-
dia groups, filed an amicus brief in support of Nike with the United 
States Supreme Court. III In contrast to the specific concerns about 
this case, Elliot Schrage, former senior vice president of global affairs 
105. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. at 2559. 
106. See Just Don't Say It: To What Extent Do Companies Have the Right to Free Speech?, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, at 59 [hereinafter Just Don't Say It Il]. 
107. Id. 
108. SRI Media PLC and CoreRatings Limited File Legal Brief with the United States 
Supreme Court in Nike v. Kasky, PRIMEZONE MEDIA NETWORK, Mar. 3, 2003, 
available at 2003 WL 4409829 [hereinafter SRI Media PLC and CoreRatings 
Limited File Legal BriefJ. 
109. Just Don't Say It IJ, supra note 106, at 59. 
llO. Nike, Inc., FY 2001 Corporate Responsibility Report, at 6, at http://www.nike. 
com/ nikebiz/ nikebizJhtml?page=29&item=fyO 1. 
Ill. SRI Media PLC and CoreRatings Limited File Legal Brief, supra note 108. 
294 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
at Gap, argued, "too much attention is paid to individual statutes at 
the expense of the bigger global picture."112 He stated: 
One could argue that the focus on U.S. legal standards, and 
cases like Kasky involving the Alien Tort claims, is misplaced. 
If Nike says on its website "Our factories never violate local 
laws," and customers in Britain can sue Nike based on that 
website, then Nike is going to change its statements regard-
less of the outcome of the Kasky case. II3 
In 2001, France enacted a new regulation, the Nouvelles Regula-
tions Economiques (NRE), which requires all nationally listed busi-
nesses to release their social and environmental information to the 
public. 1l4 Under the law developed in Kasky, if the report contains a 
false or misleading statement and the company does business in the 
State of California, the foreign company could be punished for violat-
ing California law. California law does not make exceptions for com-
panies, foreign or domestic, that are required to produce social 
responsibility reports. As stated by Peter Clarke, Director of SRI 
Media: 
We are gravely concerned about the potential 'chilling' ef-
fect of the California decision upon European business en-
terprises who may find that their [Corporate Social 
Responsibility] communications, even though issued from 
Europe to a European media audience and made in compli-
ance with European law, might well land them in a Califor-
nia Court because of the extra-territorial reach of the 
decision. II5 
In light of the California ruling, all corporate communications to 
the public will be considered advertising and will be subject to strict 
judicial scrutiny.II6 As "advertising," the communications would be 
considered commercial speech and may be subjected to a lesser level 
of First Amendment protectionY 7 Regardless of the issue the busi-
ness is addressing, the California court categorized all business com-
munications with the public that could result in product purchases as 
commercial advertising. I IS "In doing so, it authorized the suppression 
of those public statements and the seizure of the speaker's profits, 
112. Sarah Murray, Legal Case for Doing the Right Thing, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, 
at P17, available at 2003 WL 16398005. 
113. Id. (quoting Elliot Schrage). 
114. Julie Gorte, Letters to the Editor, Make Social Disclosure Mandatory, FIN. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2002, at P12, available at 2002 WL 10418828l. 
115. SRI Media PLC and CoreRatings Limited File Legal Brief, supra note 108. 
116. See Benady, supra note 17, at 4. 
117. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
u.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
118. Nike Set to Ask Appeal from Supreme Court, WOMENSWEAR, Aug. 2, 2002, availa-
ble at 2002 WL 10886292. . 
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whenever ajury deems the statements potentially incomplete or other-
wise misleading."119 The decision might stop corporate communica-
tions within California because any resident could bring a company 
"to its knees unless it persuades a jury that everything [the company J 
said was error-free and omitted nothing."120 
Kasky will have a large geographic impact not because Nike is a well-
known company, or even because of its home base. 121 The impact of 
the case is global because "[iJfyour communication is received in Cal-
ifornia ... and you're doing business there-which means every For-
tune 500 company-you have to immediately worry, right now, about 
any public statements you make about your company's practices."122 
Every company performing a business transaction within the State of 
California is bound by the laws of that state, and thereby governed by 
the outcome of Kasky. 123 This ruling even impacts businesses that post 
information on their website about labor and business practices, or 
their opinion on a public dispute. 124 
Mter Kasky, it will be necessary for lawyers to take a more active role 
in the review and issuance of press releases. 125 "Lawyers can no 
longer be passive editors. . .. Instead, they must challenge their pub-
lic relations colleagues as to whether the potential marketing gains of 
a release justify the inevitable litigation risks."126 Corporate lawyers 
will now have the additional responsibility of ensuring that their com-
panies do not disseminate anything more than the most basic business 
practice information. 127 Mter this ruling, businesses in California will 
have to think carefully before using the media to respond to employ-
ment charges. 128 Instead, businesses will have no choice but to re-
spond in court, and could suffer severe financial loss because the 
public will pass judgment before a court even hears the case. 129 
The Kasky decision could result in "the death of commercial public 
relations in California ... effectively gag[gingJ any business that 
119. Id. 
120. Benady, supra note 17, at 4. 
121. Parloff, supra note 4, at 104. In fact, Nike is headquartered in Oregon. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. at 104, 106. 
125. See David Graulich, Press Release: Write in Haste . .. Repent, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 14, 
2002, at Dl2. 
126. Id. 
127. See Mike McKee, Nike Hires Big Guns to Pursue PR Policy Statements Case, LE-
GAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 5, 2002, at 4. "The net effect of this novel ruling 
. . . is to make it extremely dangerous for virtually any business or other 
organization to utter anything beyond the most innocuous and vaporous 
generalities about its practices, whether in this country or abroad." Id. 
(quoting Professor Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law School). 
128. Steven C. Bahls &Jane Easter Bahls, Shut Up Already!, ENTREPRENEUR, Sept. 
2002, at 88. 
129. See id. 
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makes a public statement which is heard in California."130 Kathy 
Cripps, President of the V .S. Council of Public Relations Firms, com-
mented that the California law will limit how public relations depart-
ments do business, and even limit the amount of business they receive 
because companies will no longer wish to participate in public 
debate. 131 
As Judge Chin stated in his dissent in Kasky, "[h]andicapping one 
side in this important worldwide debate is both ill considered and un-
constitutional. Full free speech protection for one side and strict lia-
bility for the other will hardly promote vigorous and meaningful 
debate."132 Others have commented that this "law will stifle compa-
nies and other [organizations] from making public statements on any 
subject, even if they are only matters of opinion .... "133 "California is 
the fifth-largest market in the world. Few corporations can afford to 
Ueopardize] their operations there."134 
B. Nike is Proving to Have Many More ''Friends of the Court" Than Marc 
Kasky 
Within seven weeks of the Court granting certiorari, more than a 
dozen companies and private organizations ftled briefs in support of 
Nike's position.1 35 As previously mentioned, the V.K. media groups 
SRI Media and CoreRatings Limited ftled an amicus brief in support 
of Nike and open corporate communication.136 CBS, the network 
that originally aired the "sweatshop expose,"137 in addition to 
Microsoft, CNN, the New York Times, and the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, ftled an amicus brief with the Court in support of Nike. 138 
Surprisingly, voices of concern came not only from corporate 
America, nor additional California residents eager to file their own 
lawsuits, but from Congress. 139 Ohio Representative Dennis Kucinich 
circulated a petition asking members to support Marc Kasky.140 Ac-
cording to Representative Kucinich, if Nike were to win, the defini-
tions of commercial and political speech would be negatively 
redefIned.141 All five of Oregon's representatives signed a letter urg-
130. Benady, supra note 17, at 4 (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe, Harvard 
Law School). 
131. Id. 
132. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 263 (Cal. 2002) (Chin, j., dissenting). 
133. Benady, supra note 17, at 4. 
134. Id. (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law School). 
135. Boaz Herzog, Debate Erupts Over Nike Free-Speech Case, OREGONIAN, Mar. 26, 
2003, at E2. 
136. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
137. See Bahls, supra note 128, at 88. 
138. Just Don't Say It II, supra note 106, at 59. 
139. See Herzog, supra note 135, at E2. 
140. Id. 
141. See id. "[T]he case 'could reshape constitutional definitions of commercial 
and political speech, giving corporations unprecedented freedom to make 
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ing Congress not to support Kucinich's petition, stating that his argu-
ments "fail to tell the whole story."142 The Oregon Representatives 
wrote that only with a "full, open and transparent debate about these 
issues . . . [will] consumers receive complete and accurate informa-
tion."143 The definitions of commercial and political speech as we 
know them today could change after Kasky, but this should be viewed 
as a positive advancement towards better communication between 
businesses and consumers.144 
Other amicus briefs filed with the Court came both from corpora-
tions and public relations firms.145 In a combined amicus brief filed 
by Exxon Mobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, and Glaxo Smith Kline, 
the companies argued two points.146 First, they argued that Nike's 
statements did not fit within the definition of commercial speech be-
cause they did not cause a "commercial harm" severe enough to war-
rant a lack of First Amendment protection. 147 Second, the companies 
argued that Nike had standing to appear before the Supreme 
Court. 148 
The companies contended that speech is determined to be a matter 
of public concern through analysis of its content, form, and con-
text. 149 They argued that the context of Nike's speech, regarding is-
sues involving labor practices in developing countries, addresses issues 
of great modern day concern. 150 Nike's communication took shape in 
the form of media stories, letters to editors, and letters to athletic di-
false a~1. misleading statements in advertisements, newspaper editorials, and other 
venues. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. See Herzog, supra note 135, at E2. 
144. See supra Part lILA. 
145. See, e.g., Brief of the Center for the Advancement of Capitalism as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting the Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003) 
(No. 02-575) (urging the Supreme Court to abolish the commercial speech 
doctrine); Brief of Amici Curiae the Association of National Advertising, 
Inc., the American Advertising Federation, and the American Association 
of Advertising Agencies in Support of Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 
U.S. 1099 (2003) (No. 02-575) (stating that Nike's speech was not commer-
cial, the California court's decision would have a chilling effect on corpo-
rate communications, and Kasky did not have standing to sue because he 
suffered no harm); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States of America in Support of Petitioners, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 
537 U.S. lO99 (2003) (No. 02-575) (arguing that the California ruling 
would suppress speech on important public policy issues and that commer-
cial speech analysis should apply only to products or services offered for 
sale) . 
146. Brief of Exxon Mobil, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, and Glaxo Smith Kline as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3-5, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 
lO99 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
147. Id. at 5-2l. 
148. Id. at 21-27. 
149. Id. at 5-6. 
150. Id. at 6. 
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rectors, all of which are established venues for public debate. I51 They 
further argued that, "[l]ike any other speaker, a corporation may be 
expected to make only those statements of fact that it believes to be 
true. But whether a particular statement of fact is 'true' is often a 
matter of legitimate dispute [within a forum for public debate]."I52 
The government cannot regulate speech under the shield of the First 
Amendment merely because it prefers one side of the debate to the 
other. I53 Furthermore, "[a] pplying the commercial speech regime to 
a corporation's statements on matters of public concern would drasti-
cally curtail valuable speech on vital issues of the day."I54 
Addressing the issue of standing, the companies argued that Nike 
could invoke the Supreme Court's authority to set aside the California 
court's ruling because the ruling denied Nike a federal right-the 
First Amendment right to speak on matters of public concern. I55 
They further argued that Nike had standing before the Court based 
on its ability to show actual injury-the company had been forced to 
defend its past speech in an ongoing lawsuit, and it could show that its 
speech was chilled by the threat of more lawsuits. I56 
Another amicus brief, filed by forty leading newspapers, magazines, 
broadcasters, wire-services, and media-related professional and trade 
associations (the "News Agencies"), on behalf of Nike, focused on the 
potentially devastating impact of the California decision. 157 The brief 
stated that "[e]ven a cursory review of prominent press coverage from 
the past few years reveals a vast array of corporate speech-on issues 
ranging from race discrimination to environmental sustainability to 
personal health and safety-that would now be subject to California's 
new strict liability dragnet."I58 
First, the News Agencies argued that the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia unreasonably broadened the scope of commercial speech, al-
lowing it to encompass speech directed solely to reporters or editors 
in their functional capacities as news gatherers. I59 The state court rul-
ing provides for businesses to be "sued for consumer protection viola-
tions based on answers given to reporters' questions, press releases, 
151. [d. at 7. 
152. [d. at 9. 
153. [d. at 13. 
154. [d. at 21. 
155. [d. at 21-22. "The California statutes cause Nike injury-in-fact by forcing the 
company to defend its past speech in an ongoing lawsuit that the First 
Amendment forbids, and by chilling the company's future speech through 
the threat of more such forbidden lawsuits." [d. at 23. 
156. [d. 
157. See Brief Amici Curiae of Forty Leading Newspapers, Magazines, Broadcast-
ers, Wire-Services, and Media-Related Professional and Trade Associations 
in Support of Petitioners at 4, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003) 
(No. 02-575). 
158. [d. at 1. 
159. [d. at 4. 
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op-ed pieces or 'editorial advertisements,' regardless of whether the 
business's speech is printed or appears as part of a news story that 
includes opposing viewpoints."160 The News Agencies argued that if 
the California ruling were allowed to stand, it would impose strict-lia-
bility on businesses, while allowing their critics to comment freely.161 
They also pointed out that the more often a business responds with 
"no comment," the more likely a story will be shelved for being one-
sided. 162 As such, fearing liability, very few business-related stories will 
be published for public knowledge. 163 
Second, the News Agencies contended that the commercial speech 
restriction on business communications takes away some of the re-
sponsibility enjoyed by the media. 164 Advertisements that propose 
commercial transactions are subject to less than First Amendment 
protection because the consumer has no means to verifY the mes-
sage.165 When a business is reporting on internal practices, however, 
the media acts as a source for verification, because the public is pro-
vided with commentary on both sides of the issue, allowing each con-
sumer to make an informed decision. 166 
Pfizer, Inc. submitted an amicus brief to the Court that cited the 
valuable contribution that corporate discussions add to the market-
place of ideas. 167 It also offered the Court alternatives, should it de-
cide to uphold the California court. 168 First, Pfizer asked the Court to 
implement a "Right of Reply," allowing businesses to respond to pub-
lic accusations regarding their products, services, or business opera-
tions. 169 The "Right of Reply" would be fully protected by the First 
Amendment, thereby protecting the speaker and adding to the debate 
for the listener. 17o Only criticism by a third party would trigger the 
"Right of Reply," rendering it unlikely that a commercial speaker 
would induce criticism in order to launch a false or misleading 
reply.l7l 
Pfizer's second suggestion was that the Court clarifY its Central Hud-
son analysis to make it clear that a determination that speech is false or 
160. [d. at 4-5. 
161. [d. at 6. 
162. [d. at 15. 
163. [d. 
164. [d. at 17. 
165. [d. at 18. 
166. [d. at 20. The media acts as a screening device for the public, deciding 
whether to publish potentially misleading information at all, and if it does, 
whether to publish that information with contrasting viewpoints. See id. 
167. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Pfizer Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 1-3, Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003) (No. 02-575). 
168. [d. 
169. [d. at 21. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. at 23. 
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misleading is not a per se violation that results in immediate sanction 
without further analysis.172 It stated: 
[A] llegations that the speech at issue is false or misleading 
should not create an absolute exception to the need to ex-
amine the strength of the government's consumer protec-
tion interest in the specific circumstances, the means by 
which that interest is advanced, the potential for less restric-
tive measures to alleviate any legitimate concerns about de-
ception, and the countervailing risk of suppressing truthful 
speech of "public value."173 
Pfizer urged the Court to reverse the California decision, and set forth 
a rule stating that a determination or allegation that a business com-
munication is false or misleading should be the beginning of the First 
Amendment analysis, not the end.174 
C. Amicus Briefs Supporting Marc Kasky Favor Far-Reaching Consumer 
Rights and a Strict Interpretation of Commercial Speech 
The amicus brief submitted by the National Association of Con-
sumer Advocates (NACA) primarily focused on the validity of the Cali-
fornia unfair competition law.175 The NACA conceded that the 
California law is unusual, but argued that uniqueness in a state law 
does not make it unconstitutionaJ.l76 The NACA contended that if 
the Solicitor General's argument is upheld, then numerous federal 
statutes would be declared unconstitutional as well. 177 The brief cited 
the Truth in Lending Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as 
examples of statutes that do not require the individual to prove actual 
harm. 178 The NACA, however, failed to disclose to the Court what 
standard of proof the individual must meet in order to prevaiJ.l79 Us-
ing the Truth in Savings Act as an example of why actual injury is not 









Id. at 25. 
Id. 
Id. at 28. 
See Brief for the National Association of Consumer Advocates as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1-2, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 
(2003) (No. 02-575). 
Id. at 5. 
Id. at 5-6. The Solicitor General's "Question Presented" is whether the First 
Amendment precludes a private party to challenge deceptive statements "if 
the private party himself did not rely on those statements ... or suffer any 
actual injury by reason of such reliance." The Solicitor General proposes 
the question be answered in the negative. Id. 
Id. at 6; see also Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (A) (2001); 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(K) (a)(2)(A) (2001). 
See Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, supra note 175, at 6 
(citing numerous cases where the claimant prevailed without proving ac-
tual injury, but not examining the burden of proof on the parties or the 
elements needed to make a case on either side of the issue). 
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enforcement, it might be more cost-effective to leave enforcement to 
"individuals in the private sector who stand to profit from efficiently 
detecting and prosecuting ... violations."lso In many states, however, 
where the individual is empowered to act as an enforcer instead of a 
wronged consumer, the damage award is limited to an injunction, not 
monetary damages. lsl 
Also in support of Kasky, Congressional Representatives submitted a 
brief supporting the distinction between commercial and non-com-
mercial speech. ls2 Their brief reminded the Court of its recognition 
in Central Hudson that there is a "commonsense distinction between 
speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area 
traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of 
speech."ls3 The representatives countered Nike's "speech chilling" ar-
gument with the contention that "Nike's strong economic incentive to 
maintain and expand sales of its products, even in the face of anti-
sweatshop criticism, will ensure that it will continue speaking out 
about its labor practices."ls4 Although the representatives recognized 
that commercial speech is "less likely than other forms of speech to be 
inhibited by proper regulation,"ls5 they failed to cite any circumstance 
in which a corporation had not halted or censored its public commu-
nications in fear of court sanctions. The representatives failed to illus-
trate with certainty that corporate communications will not change 
after Kasky. How can the entire public relations industry be wrong? 
D. Because the California Ruling was Upheld, Kasky's Original Suit was 
Remanded to State Court to Investigate the Truth of Nike 's Statements 
The only issue decided by the Supreme Court of California in Kasky 
was whether Nike's advertising campaign constituted commercial 
speech. ls6 The court did not decide the issue whether the statements 
were actually false or misleading. ls7 Because the Supreme Court dis-
missed the writ of certiorari, thus upholding California's ruling that 
Nike's speech was commercial, the case was remanded to the state 









Id. at 7; see also Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4308-09 (2001). 
See Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates, supra note 175, at 7-8. 
"[M]any states authorize some form of remedy for deceptive advertising 
without all of the 'traditional' requirements described by the Solicitor Gen-
eral." Id. 
See Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent by Members of the United 
States Congress, Representatives Dennis J. Kucinich, Bernard Sanders, Cor-
rine Brown, and Bob Filner at 1, Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 537 U.S. 1099 (2003) 
(No. 02-575). 
Id. at 3-4 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980)). 
Id. at 5. 
Id. at 5-6 (quoting Friedman V. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979)). 
Kasky V. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 247 (Cal. 2002). 
Id. at 262. 
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scrutinized for false or misleading information. 188 If the content had 
been found to be false, the court would have imposed sanctions that 
would have begun a new era in corporate communications. 189 
For a period spanning more than twenty years, the Supreme Court 
Justices have struggled to define commercial speech and sent conflict-
ing signals to the public, illustrating the need for the Court to clearly 
outline the level of protection that should be afforded commercial 
speech. 190 Over the years, the Court has awarded increasing protec-
tion to commercial speech. 191 Justices Scalia and Thomas previously 
voiced their concern over the Central Hudson test and the level of Con-
stitutional protection afforded commercial speech. 192 Justice Thomas 
argued, "it is time to erase the distinction between commercial and 
political speech altogether and give full First Amendment protection 
to both."193 Others have commented that "[i]f there's any inner core 
of the First Amendment, it would be that the Amendment prohibits 
the government from weighing in in a fashion that favors one view-
point over another."194 If commercial speech is merged with political 
speech so that it has complete protection, then businesses will be able 
to continue communicating freely with the public because not every 
statement placed into the marketplace of ideas will be interpreted as 
an advertisement. 195 
By dismissing the writ of certiorari, the Court failed to answer ques-
tions that "directly concern the freedom of Americans to speak about 
public matters in public debate," and delay in answering such ques-
tions "may inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of 
free speech without making the commercial speech issue significantly 
easier to decide later on."196 Without more specific answers as to what 
188. Id. at 262-63. 
189. See id. at 250; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500, 17535 (West 1997). 
190. See Gina Holland, High Court to Weigh Nike Free-Speech Case, BRADENTON HER. 
ALD, Jan. 11, 2003, at 1. See also Parloff, supra note 4, at 110. "The Supreme 
Court of the United States has not addressed . . . the boundary between 
commercial speech and other forms of speech in many, many years, and 
the existing precedents are extremely vague." [d. (quoting Professor Rob-
ert Post, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley, School of Law). 
191. See Mauro, supra note 7; see also David G. Savage, justices to Hear Nike Free-
Speech Claim, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at Cl (stating that "Justice Clarence 
Thomas, a conservative, and Justice John Paul Stevens, a liberal, have called 
for greater free-speech protection of advertising."). 
192. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia,J., 
concurring in part) ("I share Justice Thomas's discomfort with the Central 
Hudson test, which seems to me to have nothing more than policy intuition 
to support it."). 
193. Mauro, supra note 7, at A15. 
194. Parloff, supra note 4, at 110 (quoting Walter Dellinger, Nike attorney and 
former acting Solicitor General). 
195. See id. 
196. Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2560 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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is defined as commercial speech, the California ruling "may well 'chill' 
the exercise of free speech rights."197 
Another alternative for corporate communication has surfaced and 
been endorsed by Nike CEO, Philip Knight. 198 It requires the dissemi-
nation of "audited corporate and social responsibility statements," in-
cluding information about work conditions and environmental 
issues. 199 Any false or misleading statements in these reports would be 
punishable, but it is unclear who would enforce it, what the punish-
ment would be, or how these audited statements would differ from 
those that originally led to the suit against Nike.20o It is important to 
note that after the California decision in Kasky, Nike decided not to 
publicly release its "corporate social responsibility" report.201 
E. Corporate America and the Public Relations Industry React With Surprise 
and Concern to the Court's Decision 
"[T]he Supreme Court-out of intellectual laziness or reckless in-
difference-has unwisely given trial lawyers the power to curb and to 
tax free speech."202 Companies are concerned about their rights in 
the wake of the Nike ruling, including a freedom of speech double 
standard, where individuals can say anything and corporations must 
stay silent or risk a lawsuit.203 The large economic risk that businesses 
face when forced to choose between silence and the courtroom, 
amounts to a tax on corporate free speech.204 This "tax" will have a 
chilling effect on open debate.205 
Every advertiser's public relations campaign will be affected by this 
case.206 Corporations and businesses will undergo a self-inflicted gag 
order and drop out of important public debates.207 The gag order 
might extend well beyond the United States, because British compa-
nies with U.S. affiliations warn that their websites must be monitored; 
even a British website could be subjected to California long-arm 
jurisdiction.208 
The chilling effect that Kasky will have on free speech, unless the 













Id. at 2568 (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
See Parloff, supra note 4, at llO. 
Id. 
Id. 
See Just Don't Say It II, supra note 106. 
Robert]. Samuelson, The Tax on Free Speech, NEWSWEEK,July 14, 2003, at 4l. 
See id. This author suggests that failure to immediately strike down the Cali-
fornia ruling could lead to censorship of public comments. Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
See Nike Faces Legal Challenge to its Freedom of Speech, CAMPAIGN, July 11, 2003, 
at 12. 
Sandy Brown, For Corporate Speech, the Other Shoe is Yet to Dmp: Issue in Limbo 
After Supreme Court Dismisses Nike Case, ADWEEK, June 30, 2003, at 7. 
See Nike Faces Legal Challenge to its Freedom of Speech, supra note 206, at 12. 
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impact public debate. If, under California law, or subsequent federal, 
law, public relations materials were deemed commercial speech, the 
public would hear "distorted views and the press would only hear one 
side of the argument regarding difficult and important issues.''209 In 
short, the marketplace of ideas as we know it today would cease to 
exist. 
On June 27, 2003, the day after the Supreme Court dismissed the 
writ of certiorari, the economic market felt the sting of stifling com-
mercial speech when Nike's stock fell six percent.210 Since the 
Court's decision, Nike has investigated the possibility of cutting back 
its public relations activities.211 The company, however, is not al-
lowing the lack of a final ruling from the Supreme Court change eve-
rything it does; Nike will continue to endorse athletes in exchange for 
their communication of a message to the public.212 How Nike will 
communicate that message, to what audience, and whether it will lead 
Nike to court is a question that ,remains unanswered. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
CBS had no idea how its routine television expose on Nike's busi-
ness practices would impact the future of worldwide communication. 
By dismissing the writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court ran the risk of 
significantly hindering public debate and corporate communications 
in general. In deciding to hear the case, many originally hoped that 
the tests for commercial speech would either be redefined, or the dis-
tinction would be erased entirely.213 There is still a distinct possibility 
that global commercial speech will change; but we will have to wait to 
find out its ultimate fate. For now, individuals like Marc Kasky are 
free to say anything they want about a corporation, but no one will 
know the accuracy of those comments. Further delaying a detailed 
analysis of commercial speech, but in an attempt to improve the work-
place environment, Nike and Kasky settled their dispute in September 
2003.214 It was reported that both parties agreed that a settlement 
would be more beneficial than future litigation to factory workers 
209. Douglas Quenqua, U.S. Supreme Court opts Not to Rule on Nike PR Case, 
BRAND REpUBLIC, june 28, 2003, at 1. 
210. Chris Ayres, Nike Faces Trial jar Lying, TIMES OF LONDON, june 28, 2003, at 
20. 
211. Nike Goes jar Retro Cred in $305m Deal to Buy Converse, BRAND REpUBLIC, july 
11, 2003, at 1. 
212. See Matthew Garrahan, How to Keep Doing it All Over the Warld, FIN. TIMES, 
Aug. 5, 2003, at 10. 
213. See supra Part lILA. 
214. Press Release, Nike, Inc. and Kasky Announce Settlement of Kasky v. Nike 
First Amendment Case (Sept. 12,2003), at http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/ 
news/pressreIeasejhtml?year=2003&month=09&letter=f (last visited jan. 
23,2004). 
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around the globe.215 As stated by the plaintiff's attorney, Patrick 
Coughlin: 
Ultimately, both Nike and Mr. Kasky agreed that this resolu-
tion benefits two key groups: factory workers and consumers 
worldwide. Given the [Fair Labor Association's] collabora-
tion across a wide spectrum of companies, universities and 
[non-governmental organizations], it is an excellent vehicle 
for Nike to further develop its corporate responsibility efforts 
and allow interested consumers to measure the performance 
of Nike and other companies through public reporting. Mr. 
Kasky is satisfied that this settlement reflects Nike's commit-
ment to positive change where factory workers are 
concerned.:h6 
Settlement might have been the best outcome for the parties 
named in the suit, but there remains a high level of concern over the 
impact of the California ruling.217 The primary concern coming from 
corporations, media and non-government organizations alike, is that 
they cannot include company publicity within their annual social re-
sponsibility reports. 218 A general fear of publicity within businesses 
that communicate within California will impact future communica-
tions, whether there is a court case in the near future or not. Nike is 
continuing its fight for "corporate transparency,"219 but it will take an-
other attack on corporate communications to bring commercial 
speech back into the United States Supreme Court arena. 
Alyssa L. Paladino 
215. [d. Nike has agreed to make additional workplace-related program invest-
ments (augmenting the company's existing expenditures on monitoring, 
etc.) totaling $1.5 million. Nike's contribution will go to the Washington, 
D.C. based Fair Labor Association (FlA) for program operations and 
worker development programs focused on education and economic oppor-
tunity. [d. 
216. [d. 
217. See id. 
218. [d. 
219. [d. 
